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LIMITATION

OF

ACTIONS-LEGAL

MALPRACTICE-LEGAL

MALPRACTICE COMMITTED WHILE WORKING ON CASES WHICH RESULT
IN LITIGATION TOLLS THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS FOR THE MALPRACTICE CLAIM UNTIL ALL APPEALS FOR THE UNDERLYING CAUSES OF ACTION ARE EXHAUSTED.

Hughes v. Mahaney, 821 S.W.2d 154 (Tex. 1991).

James and Patti Hughes hired Robert Mahaney in October 1982 to assist
them in adopting a child. On the baby's birth date, the child's biological
mother signed an affidavit, irrevocable after sixty days, which terminated her
parental rights. This affidavit named Mahaney, not the Hugheses, as temporary managing conservator for the child.
As planned, the Hugheses brought suit to terminate the mother's parental
rights and to complete the adoption process. However, in February of 1983,
after the sixty day period expired, the biological mother attempted to revoke
her affidavit of relinquishment and sought a writ of habeas corpus for possession of the child. The Hugheses then amended their adoption pleadings,
seeking involuntary termination of the biological mother's parental rights.
The trial judge named the Hugheses as the temporary managing conservators and refused to issue the habeas corpus writ. However, knowing that
Mahaney, and not the Hugheses, was named on the affidavit as temporary
conservator of the child, the biological mother moved to dismiss the
Hugheses' suit because they lacked standing. Following a jury trial, the
court awarded permanent custody to the Hugheses and terminated the biological mother's rights. On March 7, 1985, the Waco Court of Appeals reversed the custody award to the Hugheses and ordered dismissal of their suit
because they lacked standing to terminate the biological mother's rights.
On May 21, 1987, the Hugheses instituted a malpractice suit against Mahaney and his law firm for negligence and for violations of the Texas Deceptive Trade Practices Act (DTPA).1 The Hugheses alleged that Mahaney's

1. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. §§ 17.41-17.63 (Vernon 1987).
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failure to name them as temporary conservators on the affidavit to terminate
the biological mother's parental rights rendered them unable to adopt the
child.
Mahaney moved for summary judgment on the ground that the two-year
statute of limitations for both the negligence claims and DTPA violations
had elapsed. The trial court granted summary judgment for both of these
claims. The Hugheses only appealed the granting of summary judgment for
the negligence claim. The court of appeals found that the malpractice claim
accrued on March 7, 1985, when the Waco Court of Appeals rendered its
decision and when the Hugheses discovered or should have discovered Mahaney's negligence. Therefore, the Mahaney's 1987 malpractice suit was
barred.
Without determining when the malpractice cause of action accrued, the
Texas Supreme Court reversed the appellate court decision and remanded
the case to the trial court. The Texas Supreme Court held that the statute of
limitations for the malpractice claim was tolled until the parties exhausted
all the appeals of the underlying adoption lawsuit.
Since the adoption of the Model Rules of Professional Responsibility in
1969, regulation of the legal profession through malpractice actions has
greatly increased.2 Attorneys are held accountable for negligence committed
while performing their services, as are other professionals.3
Legal malpractice takes several forms: giving faulty or inaccurate advice;
not providing advice when legally required; disregarding a client's directions; performing acts when the client clearly instructs the attorney otherwise; delinquently handling a client's matters; or violating the appropriate
standard of care in preparing, handling, and presenting a client's litigation.'
The lawyer's standard of care is that which is "exercised by a reasonably
prudent attorney, based on the information the attorney has at the time of
the alleged act of negligence." 5 Because the attorney-client relationship is
one of loyalty and trust, establishing that an attorney has breached his duty
of care is not an insurmountable barrier in legal malpractice claims.6
Rather, the difficulty lies in establishing the remaining elements of the claim:

2. See Jay H. Henderson, Comment, McClung v. Johnson: Limitationsin Legal Malpractice Actions, 34 BAYLOR L. REV. 269, 269 (1982) (recently claims for attorney malpractice
have multiplied exponentially).
3. Zidell v. Bird, 692 S.W.2d 550, 553 (Tex. App.-Austin 1985, no writ).
4. Id. See generally Steven K. Ward, Legal Malpractice in Texas, 19 S. TEx. L.J. 587
(1978) (discussing history of legal malpractice).

5. Dyer v. Shafer, Gilliland, Davis, McCollum & Ashley, Inc., 779 S.W.2d 474, 477 (Tex.
App.-El Paso 1989, writ denied).
6. Cf Willis v. Maverick, 760 S.W.2d 642, 645 (Tex. 1988) (discussing fiduciary relationship existing between attorney and client).
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that the attorney's breach of duty proximately caused damages to the client.7
Statutes of limitations are defenses to a cause of action and require a party
to bring an action within a specified time period.' While oftentimes statutes
of limitations can be the ultimate adjudicator of a cause of action by curtailing an injured party's right to seek redress, they are based on principles of
fairness. A party should prosecute his or her claims within a reasonable
amount of time so that the opponent has an adequate opportunity to defend,
witnesses remain accessible and able to remember, and other forms of evidence still exist. 9
Although injured clients attempt to classify their legal malpractice claims
as breach of contract actions in order to obtain the benefits of a longer statute of limitations period, Texas courts emphatically state that a claim for
legal malpractice is based in common-law negligence.1 ° Therefore, the twoyear statute of limitations for torts applies. 1 However, with legal malpractice actions, the statute of limitations only begins to run when "the claimant
discovers or should have discovered, through the exercise of reasonable care
12
and diligence, the facts establishing the elements of his cause of action."
While this "discovery rule" applies to toll the statute of limitations, the in-

7. See Zidell, 692 S.W.2d at 554 (maintaining cause of action only if some damage, even
if completely incalculable, established as resulting from negligence); Fireman's Fund Am. Ins.
Co. v. Patterson & Lamberty, Inc., 528 S.W.2d 67, 69 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1975, writ ref'd
n.r.e.) (requiring claimant to prove that damage resulted); see also Paul D. Rheinhold, Legal
Malpractice: Plaintif'sStrategies, 15 LITIG. 13, 16 (1989) (malpractice in "case within a case"
still requires showing of proximate cause).
8. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 835 (5th ed. 1979).
9. United States v. Kubrick, 444 U.S. 111, 123 (1979); Willis v. Maverick, 760 S.W.2d
642, 644 (Tex. 1988); Robinson v. Weaver, 550 S.W.2d 18, 20 (Tex. 1977); Price v. Estate of
Anderson, 522 S.W.2d 690, 692 (Tex. 1975); Gaddis v. Smith, 417 S.W.2d 577, 578 (Tex.
1967); see also Joseph H. Koffier, Legal MalpracticeStatutes of Limitations: A CriticalAnalysis of a Burgeoning Crisis, 20 AKRON L. REV. 209, 211 (1986); David M. Ledbetter, Malpractice: Black v. Littlejohn: A New Discovery Formula for Non-Apparent Injuries under the
Professional Malpractice Statute of Limitations, 64 N.C. L. REv. 1438, 1443 (1986); Jay H.
Henderson, Comment, McClung v. Johnson: Limitations in Legal Malpractice Actions, 34
BAYLOR L. REV. 269, 270 (1982) (limitations periods are established to prevent litigating stale
or false claims).
10. Woodburn v. Turley, 625 F.2d 589, 592 (5th Cir. 1980); Willis, 760 S.W.2d at 644;
Liles v. Phillips, 677 S.W.2d 802, 807 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1984, writ reed n.r.e.); Citizens
State Bank of Dickinson v. Shapiro, 575 S.W.2d 375, 386 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1978, writ
refd n.r.e.).
11. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 16.003 (Vernon 1986); Willis, 760 S.W.2d, at
644; Ernest E. Figari, Jr. et al., Texas Civil Procedure,43 SW. L.J. 485, 497-98 (1989). Compare Pham v. Nguyen, 763 S.W.2d 467, 469 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1988, writ
denied) (no matter how plaintiff attempts to plead legal malpractice claim, statute of limitations is two years) with First Nat'l Bank of Eagle Pass v. Levine, 721 S.W.2d 287, 288-89 (Tex.
1986) (two-year statute of limitations for trespass and tortiously interfering with business).
12. Willis, 760 S.W.2d at 646 (emphasis added).
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jured party still must exercise reasonable diligence in uncovering factors that
put the injured party on sufficient notice that a claim exists for the alleged
wrongdoing.' 3 Therefore, when a cause of action "accrues" is a very important, yet often difficult question to answer.
Determining when a cause of action "accrues" for limitations periods is a
question of law for the court to decide.' 4 In determining when a claim for
legal malpractice accrues, Texas courts follow the "damage rule" which
states that the claim begins once the attorney committed a tort and at least
some damage to the client is calculable.' 5 Texas courts have previously held
that a third-party's threatened litigation for attorney malpractice will not
invoke the statute of limitations because only the potential for suit exists at
16
that time.
While the plaintiff has the burden of pleading and proving that the discovery rule applies, the defendant must present sufficient evidence that discovery was made prior to the running the statute of limitations.' However, on
many occasions Texas courts have found that if the plaintiff failed to establish that the discovery rule applied, the plaintiff's cause of action would accrue under the "legal injury" rule. The rule has been defined as:

13. Nichols v. Smith, 507 S.W.2d 518, 521 (Tex. 1974); Courseview, Inc. v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 158 Tex. 597, 312 S.W.2d 197, 204-05 (1957); Slay v. Burnett Trust Co., 143 Tex.
621, 187 S.W.2d 377, 394 (1945); Jay H. Henderson, Comment, McClung v. Johnson: Limitations in Legal MalpracticeActions, 34 BAYLOR L. REV. 269, 270 (1982).
14. Gaddis v. Smith, 417 S.W.2d 577, 580 (Tex. 1967) (quoting Fernandi v. Strully, 173
A.2d 277, 285-86 (N.J. 1961)); see also Jay H. Henderson, Comment, McClung v. Johnson:
Limitations in Legal MalpracticeActions, 34 BAYLOR L. REV. 269, 270 (1982). For a discussion on when the limitations periods for all jurisdictions begins for attorney malpractice, see
Francis M. Dougherty, Annotation, When Statute of Limitations Begins to Run upon Action
againstAttorney for Malpractice, 32 A.L.R. 4TH 260 (1984).
15. McClung v. Johnson, 620 S.W.2d 644, 646 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1981, writ ref'd
n.r.e.); see also DENNIS J. HORAN & GEORGE W. SPELLMIRE, ATrORNEY MALPRACTICE:
PREVENTION AND DEFENSE 21-7 (1989) (discussing difference between occurrence rule and
damage rule for establishing when a legal malpractice claim accrues); Joseph H. Koffler, Legal
Malpractice Statutes of Limitations: A CriticalAnalysis of a Burgeoning Crisis, 20 AKRON L.
REV. 209, 224 (1986) (courts often require ascertainable damages but not complete amount for
malpractice claim to accrue).
16. Independent Life & Accident Ins. Co. v. Childs, Fortenbach, Beck & Guyton, 756
S.W.2d 54, 55 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 1988, no writ); Cox v. Rosser, 579 S.W.2d 73, 75-76
(Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1979, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Atkins v. Crosland, 417 S.W.2d 150, 153
(Tex. 1967).
17. See Burns v. Thomas, 786 S.W.2d 266, 267 (Tex. 1990) (limitations statute no bar
when, after applying discovery rule, defendant failed to establish accrual date for attorney
negligence claim); Independent Life & Accident, 756 S.W.2d at 55 (defendant-attorney failed to
establish that plaintiff discovered or should have discovered defendant's negligence within two
years of filing suit); Ernest E. Figari, Jr. et al., Annual Survey of Texas Law: Civil Procedure,
45 SW. L.J. 73 (1991) (discussion of cases during survey period, including cases finding that
defendant must negate discovery rule).
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[A] cause of action sounding in tort generally accrues when the tort is
completed, that is, the act committed and damage suffered.... The date
of the legal injury is not the time it is discovered or the date when actual
damage is fully ascertained.... If the defendant's conduct results in an
invasion of the plaintiff's legally protected interest, so that he may obtain an immediate remedy in court, his right of action "accrues" with
the invasion, provided some legally cognizable injury, however slight,
has resulted from the invasion or would necessarily do so. 8
The legal injury rule has some harsh results. In Smith v. McKinney, 9 the
plaintiff-client hired an attorney to represent her in a divorce matter in November 1981. However, the attorney incorrectly advised her to sign a document which, as the facts established, gave away her interest in retirement
benefits. The client discovered this problem in April 1985, long after she
finalized the divorce decree which failed to address the retirement benefits.
In October 1986, the client then instituted her malpractice action but failed
to prove that the discovery rule applied.2 ° Therefore, in applying the legal
injury rule, the court found her injuries occurred in 1981 and her malpractice claim was time-barred. 2 '
The analysis used by the Texas Supreme Court in Hughes resembles previous decisions applying the discovery rule to legal malpractice cases.2 2 In
Willis v. Maverick,2 3 Justice Kilgarlin, writing for the majority stated,
Were we to follow the general rule, the client could protect himself fully
only by ascertaining malpractice at the moment of its incidence. To do
so, he would have to hire a second attorney to observe the work of the
first. This costly and impractical solution would but serve to undermine the confidential relationship between attorney and client.24
Thus, Justice Kilgarlin reasoned that preserving the sanctity of the attorneyclient relationship justifies extending the period of time in which an attorney
is subject to malpractice until the client discovers or should have discovered
the problems.2 5
18. Black v. Wills, 758 S.W.2d 809, 816 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1988, writ denied).
19. Smith v. McKinney, 792 S.W.2d 740 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1990, writ
denied).
20. Id. at 741.
21. Id. at 742.
22. Compare Hughes v. Mahaney, 821 S.W.2d 154, 156 (Tex. 1991) (discussing application of discovery rule to legal malpract claims) with Willis, 760 S.W.2d at 646 (applying discovery rule to legal malpractice action).
23. 760 S.W.2d 642 (Tex. 1988).
24. Id. at 646.
25. See id. at 645 (special fiduciary duty of attorneys to their clients justifies the discovery
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In Hughes, the court's holding again asserts that an attorney's duty to his
client outweighs his own interest in avoiding malpractice liability. 26 Accordingly, applying the discovery rule to legal malpractice claims is justified.
Justice Cornyn states that absent application of the discovery rule, a client
would be forced to compromise both the malpractice claim and the underlying appeal because they represent inconsistent arguments. In one case, the
client must argue that the attorney committed malpractice which greatly
affected the client's position. However, concerning appellate review of the
second underlying claim, the client must advocate that the attorney's conduct was proper or only slightly injurious.2 7 Therefore, if the legal process
precludes an individual from seeking his or her legal remedy, the time in
which the plaintiff may seek redress should not include the period in which
he or she is prevented from seeking such a remedy.28 However, nationally,
jurisdictions are split on whether to apply this tolling rule for legal malpractice cases.29
Although the Hughes Court did not emphasize this point, Texas courts
have found other instances which toll the statute of limitations for legal malpractice. The legal malpractice statute of limitations is tolled in two other
situations: when the attorney fraudulently conceals facts which establish a
legal malpractice claim,3 ° and when the attorney-client relationship continues after the negligence occurred. 3 Thus, Hughes simply establishes an26. See Hughes, 821 S.W.2d at 157 (concluding that statute of limitation tolled pending
all underlying appeals).
27. Id.; see Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co. v. Lane, 565 So.2d 1323, 1326 (Fla. 1990)
(inconsistency exists when forced to appeal underlying claim while prosecuting malpractice
claim).
28. Hughes, 821 S.W.2d at 157; Walker v. Hanes, 570 S.W.2d 534, 540 (Tex. Civ. App.-

Corpus Christi 1978, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Cavitt v. Amsler, 242 S.W.2d 246, 249 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Austin 1922, writ dism'd).
29. See Zupan v. Berman, 491 N.E.2d 1349, 1351 (Il1. App. Ct. 1986) (legal malpractice

claims accrue when duty breached, not when damage occurs, and courts will not toll statute to
determine full extent of damages); see also Richardson v. Denend, 795 P.2d 1192, 1195 n.7
(Wash. Ct. App. 1990) (client is on notice of potential legal malpractice claim when trial court
enters adverse judgment, as a matter of law). But see Amfac Distrib. Corp v. Miller, 673 P.2d
795, 797 (Ariz. Ct. App.) (limitations statute should be tolled until plaintiff's damages are not
conditioned on the appeals process), aff'd as supplemented, 673 P.2d 792, 793 (Ariz. 1983) and
Peat, Marwick Mitchell & Co., 565 So.2d at 1326 (although case concerns accounting malpractice, court analogizes rules for legal malpractice and finds that arguing malpractice while

appealing underlying claim is inconsistent).
30. See Owen v. King, Ill S.W.2d 695, 697-98 (Tex. 1938) (fraudulent concealment);
Liles v. Phillips, 677 S.W.2d 802, 807-08 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1984, writ refd n.r.e.)

(fraud or fraudulent concealment).
31. Jimenez v. Maloney, 646 S.W.2d 673, 675-76 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1983, writ
dism'd) (continuation of attorney-client relationship); McClung v. Johnson, 620 S.W.2d 644,
647 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1981, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (attorney still has employment relationship
with client); see also Jay H. Henderson, Comment, McClung v. Johnson: Limitations in Legal
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other tolling exception for the statute of limitations for legal malpractice
claims.3 2
Tolling the statute of limitations until all appeals for the underlying claim
are exhausted will help establish the true extent of the client's damages.33
Previously, the discovery rule required the plaintiff to bring the malpractice
claim after discovering any harm, even if the harm was slight. 4 In American Medical Electronics v. Korn," the court determined that although the
damage caused by a third party suit for patent infringement was more substantial, the client knew of his attorney's malpractice when he sought a second opinion on the patent matter.36 Now, even if the attorney's negligence
adversely affects the client at the trial court, the client will suffer no actionable damage if the harm is rectified on appeal.3 7
However, in the Hughes decision, the court fails to address when a cause
of action for malpractice accrues.38 Presumably, the date that all appeals for
the underlying claim are exhausted establishes the accrual date for the legal
malpractice claim. This raises the issue of whether the statute of limitations
is tolled if an attorney commits malpractice in "prosecuting or defending a
claim that results in litigation" but the client does not seek appellate review.
In Aduddell v. Parkhill,39 decided the same day as Hughes, the Texas

Supreme Court found that a client's legal malpractice action was not barred
when the defendants-attorneys failed to file the client's asbestosis lawsuit
within the statute of limitations.' Again, the supreme court did not decide
when the plaintiff's malpractice claim accrued even though the defendants
alleged that it accrued on the day the limitations expired on the asbestosis
claim. However, the plaintiff did not appeal the asbestosis claim and, on
remand, the court could find that the statute of limitations still barred AdudMalpracticeActions, 34 BAYLOR L. REV. 269, 269 (1982) (discussing fraud and continuingrelationship tolling exceptions to statute of limitations).

32. Cf DENNIS J. HORAN & GEORGE W. SPELLMIRE, ATTORNEY MALPRACTICE: PREVENTION AND DEFENSE 21-1 (1989) (recently, the ability to assert the statute of limitations as
defense for legal malpractice claims is lessening as various courts accept exceptions to when
the claim accrues).
33. Cf Paul D. Rheingold, Legal Malpractice.- Plaintiffs Strategies, 15 LITIG. 13, 13
(1989) (for plaintiff to recover in "cases within legal malpractice cases," client must prove that
had lawyer completed requisite work, result might have been different).
34. American Medical Electronics v. Korn, 819 S.W.2d 573, 577 (Tex. App.-Dallas
1991, writ denied).
35. 819 S.W.2d 573 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1991, writ denied).
36. Id. at 578.
37. Cf Amfac Distrib. Corp. v. Miller, 673 P.2d 792, 794 (Ariz. 1983) (en banc) (damages in legal malpractice claims will only be ascertainable when appellate time frame is completed, but if some negligence exists, no damages to client translates into no cause of action).
38. Hughes, 821 S.W.2d at 157.
39. 821 S.W.2d 158 (Tex. 1991).
40. Aduddell v. Parkhill, 821 S.W.2d 158, 159 (Tex. 1991).
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dell's claim because he did not attempt to appeal the underlying cause of
action.4 1 Thus, the possibility exists that a client will attempt to take another "bite at the apple" by reaping the benefits of the tolling rule rather
than appealing the underlying cause of action. 42
Although the Hughes decision preserves the attorney-client relationship
and ensures that the plaintiff did suffer actual damages before being forced to
sue or lose the malpractice claim, this decision leaves open additional issues.
The United States Supreme Court has held that a court-appointed attorney
for federal criminal matters may remain liable for legal malpractice under
state law.43 Therefore, the Texas Supreme Court's new tolling rule could
apply to criminal matters.
Also, the Hughes decision does not make clear how tenuous the claim
"resulting in litigation" must be. Several of the cases analyzed by Justice
Cornyn in Hughes discuss malpractice in advising clients and not in litigat-

ing a claim; their discussion of the "exhaustion of appeals" rule was in
dicta." Presumably, out of some fairness for the attorney, the malpractice
must be in preparing for litigation rather than merely giving advice. A contrary application could feasibly result in the indefinite possibility of malpractice liability.4 5
Additionally, Hughes does not make clear the type of damages the plaintiff must show once the underlying appeals are completely exhausted.4"
Damages would certainly be more concrete and less speculative once the

41. Id.
42. Cf Joseph H. Koffler, Legal MalpracticeDamages in a Trial Within a Trial-A Critical Analysis of Unique Concepts: Areas of Unconscionability,73 MARQ. L. REV. 40, 47 (1989)
(legal malpractice action may be only available avenue for client to recover damages for attorney's alleged misconduct).
43. Ferri v. Ackerman, 444 U.S. 193, 205 (1979); see also THOMAS P. BROWN I1, How
TO AVOID BEING SUED BY YOUR CLIENT: PREVENTIONS AND CURES FOR LEGAL MAL-

9-10 (1981) (brochure discusses Ferri while presenting various steps an attorney
may take to avoid malpractice claims).
44. See, e.g., Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co. v. Lane, 565 So.2d 1323, 1324 (Fla. 1990)
(accounting malpractice regarding tax advice); Dixon v. Shafton, 649 S.W.2d 435, 436 (Mo.
1983) (en banc) (advice over contract dispute but not litigation); Zimmie v. Calfee, Halter &
Griswold, 538 N.E.2d 398, 399 (Ohio 1989) (malpractice in drafting antenuptial agreement);
Hennekens v. Hoerl, 465 N.W.2d 812, 813-14 (Wis. 1991) (drafting of financing contingency
clause in land purchase contract).
45. In probate law, for example, negligence may not be discovered for a generation. As
such, an attorney could feasibly be liable for malpractice indefinitely.
46. See Joseph H. Koffier, Legal MalpracticeDamages in a Trial within a Trial-a Critical Analysis of Unique Concepts: Areas of Unconscionability,73 MARQ. L. REV. 40, 41 (1989)
(client may be required to establish success regarding the underlying action but for the attorney's improper conduct). The Hughes decision does not appear to change the requirement that
the plaintiff in negligence cases must plead and prove that the statute of limitations should be
tolled. Willis, 760 S.W.2d at 647; Weaver v. Witt, 561 S.W.2d 792, 794 n.2 (Tex. 1977).
PRACTICE
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case has been heard before the trial court and one or more appellate courts.
However, the longer the courts extend the time in which an attorney remains
liable, the more difficult it will be to preserve and evaluate the evidence for a
malpractice claim.47 Although the tolling effect will definitely extend the
time in which an attorney may remain liable for his malpractice, the Texas
Supreme Court believes this burden of extending liability should be borne by
the attorney rather than the client.4 8
Unfortunately, the decision in Hughes will require attorneys to question
whether their malpractice insurance coverage adequately covers their work.
Most policies require that the policy be effective when the claim is made.49
As a consequence, attorneys will basically be forced to maintain their insurance coverage for periods long after they retire.50
The Texas Supreme Court appears content to follow its new tolling exception for the statute of limitations as formulated in Hughes."' In Gulf Coast
Investment Corporation v. Brown, 2 the plaintiff, Gulf Coast, attempted to
foreclose on property held by Thomas and Darlene Smith. 3 In response,
the Smiths filed and won a wrongful foreclosure action against Gulf Coast
for giving improper notice on the foreclosure sale. 4 The Texas Supreme
Court, in a per curiam opinion, held that the tolling exception could apply
when legal malpractice results in a third-party wrongful foreclosure suit as
opposed to an appeal of underlying claims.5 5
Therefore, Hughes has a major impact on the extent of attorney malpractice liability. Although studies show that most attorneys facing malpractice
claims eventually win the lawsuit, attorneys still face greater liability for
their actions.5 6 The fact that legal malpractice is generally found only in the
most egregious of cases should come as no surprise because attorneys con-

47. Joseph H. Koffler, Legal Malpractice Damages in a Trial within a Trial--a Critical
Analysis of Unique Concepts: Areas of Unconscionability, 73 MARQ. L. REV. 40, 41, 48-50
(1989).
48. Cf Willis, 760 S.W.2d at 646 (any burden on attorney by applying discovery rule is
less burdensome than injustice in denying relief to injured clients).
49. Steven K. Ward, Developments in Legal Malpractice Liability, 31 S. TEX. L.J. 121,
137 (1990).

50. See id. (discovery rule requires retired attorneys to maintain insurance coverage).
51. Gulf Coast Investment Corp. v. Brown, 821 S.W.2d 159, 160 (Tex. 1991); Aduddell
v. Parkhill, 821 S.W.2d 158, 159 (Tex. 1991).

52. 821 S.W.2d 159 (Tex. 1991).
53. Id. at 160.
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. Roger M. Baron, The Expansion of Legal Malpractice Liability in Texas, 29 S. TEX.
L.J. 355, 355, 359 (1988); see Steven K. Ward, Developments in Legal MalpracticeLiability, 31
S. TEX. L.J. 121, 122 (1990) (trend will continue that lawyers face greater liability).
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tribute so much financially to the elected judiciary system in Texas." However, the opinion in Hughes indicates that the judiciary is inclined to find
exceptions to the statute of limitations on legal malpractice claims and
thereby extend the time period during which lawyers are justifiably subject
to lawsuits. Given the ramifications of the Hughes outcome and the growing
awareness of the courts' hostilities towards attorney malpractice, attorneys
should take advantage of numerous liability-avoidance articles.58
The Hughes v. Mahaney decision reflects the growing interest in preserving the attorney-client relationship throughout the appellate process. The
decision makes a great deal of sense because an attorney may commit some
error during the initial stages of prosecuting or defending a claim which is
rectified on appeal. Unfortunately, the lawyer who commits the malpractice
may be subject to a client's lawsuit years after the incident in question
occurred.
Dina Bernstein

57. Cf. Roger M. Baron, The Expansion of Legal Malpractice Liability in Texas, 29 S.
TEX. L.J. 355, 357 (1988) (attorneys exert much political and economic clout over the Texas

judiciary).
58. See, e.g., Duke N. Stern, How to Avoid Being Sued-Special Problems of the Lawyer
Engaged in the Litigtion Process, in PROFESSIONAL LIABILITY OF TRIAL LAWYERS: THE
MALPRACTICE QUESTION 116 (A.B.A. ed., 1979) (article on malpractice avoidance for litigators); THOMAS P. BROWN III, HOW TO AVOID BEING SUED BY YOUR CLIENT: PREVEN-

TIONS AND CURES FOR LEGAL MALPRACTICE 9-10 (1981)
malpractice claims).

https://commons.stmarytx.edu/thestmaryslawjournal/vol23/iss4/8
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